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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH WHITMORE, A Minor
by and through his Guardian ad litem
SAM 0. WHITMORE,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, CALAVO GROWERS OF
CALIFORNIA, MELVIN J. ROMNEY and EMPLOYERS INSURANCE
OF WAUSAU, a Corporation,
Defendants.
KENNETH WHITMORE, a Minor,
by and through his Guardian ad litem,
SAM 0. WHITMORE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
CALAVO GROWERS OF CALIFORNIA, a Corporation, and MELVIN J.
ROMNEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

12730

Case No.

12367

Brief of Petitioner and Appellants
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kenneth Whitmore was injured suffering permanent partial disability in a motor vehicle accident on June
2, 1967, in Salt Lake County, Utah. Thereafter, he and
1

his father, Sam 0. Whitmore, sought to recover damages
in a negligence action brought in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against
Melvin J. Romney, driver of the vehicle in which Kenneth
Whitmore was riding at the time of the accident. Subsequently, by amended complaint, Romney's employer, Cal·
avo Growers of California, was joined as a party defendant. Calavo Growers moved to dismiss on the ground that '
Plaintiffs' sole remedy was provided by the Utah Workmen's Compensation Statute. Subsequently, Kenneth
Whitmore filed a claim for workmen's compensation with
the Utah Industrial Commission.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The District Court, Judge Marcellus K. Snow, presiding, dismissed the Complaint of Kenneth and Sam 0.
Whitmore against Calavo Growers of California and Melvin Romney "on the merits, and with prejudice, on the
ground and for the reason that Plaintiffs' sole remedy was
under workmen's compensation. . . . "
Thereafter, Kenneth Whitmore's claim for workmen's compensation was refused by the hearing exam·
iner on the ground that the claim was filed after the
three-year statute of limitations had elapsed. Whitmore's
Motion for Review to the Industrial Commission was sub· '
sequently denied. (Tr. No. 12730 at 132-133.)
Applicant and Petitioner, Kenneth Whitmore, (here·
inafter Petitioner) petitioned for Writ of Review and
2

was granted leave to challenge the legality of the Industrial Commission's ruling. Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Kenneth Whitmore and his father, Sam 0. Whitmore,
appeal from the Order of the Third Judicial District Court
dismissing their Complaint with prejudice.
Both causes have been consolidated for the purpose
of this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On this consolidated appeal, relief is sought from
the rulings of the Industrial Commission and the Third
Judicial District Court.
First, Petitioner, Kenneth Whitmore, seeks vacation
of the Industrial Commission's ruling that his claim for
workmen's compensation is barred by the statute of limitations.
Appellants, Kenneth Whitmore and Sam 0. Whitmore, seek reversal of the District Court's Order dismissing
Appellants' Complaint with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
About June 1, 1967, Dino DiLello and Kenneth
Whitmore, at that time 14 years old, were requested by
their schoolmate and friend, Donald Romney, to come to
Growers Market in Salt Lake City and help him sort
coconuts for his father, Melvin Romney, branch manager
for Calavo Growers of California. The evening before
the boys were to go to work, Kenneth Whitmore's father,
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Sam 0. Whitmore, called Melvin Romney, and asked if
he brought his son and the Dilello boy to the market the
next day, whether they could ride home with Mr. Rom.
ney. This was apparently agreed upon and all three of
the boys, Donald Romney, Dino Dilello and Kenneth
Whitmore, spent the day of June 2, 1967, sorting coco.
nuts at Growers Market. Donald Romney remembers
that Kenneth Whitmore and Dino Dilello were later
paid for their work. (Deposition of Donald Romney at
4.) His father, Melvin Romney, states that he kept a
petty cash fund from which such disbursements were generally made. (Tr. No. 12730 at 48.)
Near the end of the day, Appellant, Kenneth, and the
other boys loaded some distressed merchandise (rose
bushes packed in cardboard boxes) onto Mr. Romney's
personal pickup truck to be taken to his home and disposed of. (Tr. No. 12730 at 50.) During the trip to Mr.
Romney's home, Kenneth Whitmore, who was riding
with the merchandise in the back of Mr. Romney's pickup
truck with the other boys, was thrown or fell from the
vehicle suffering permanent injuries.
In October of 1968, Appellants, Kenneth Whitmore
and his father Sam 0. Whitmore commenced legal action against Melvin Romney. Subsequently, Calavo Growers of California was joined as a party defendant. Prior
to joining Calavo Growers, however, Appellants' legal
counsel contacted the policy clerk of the Utah Industrial
Commission to determine whether there had been a filing
of an employers' liability insurance policy during the
4

period of October 1, 1966, to October 1, 1967, by Melvin
Romney or Calavo Growers in accordance with the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act. It was reported that there
was no record of any such filing. (Tr. No. 12730 at 63
and 99.)
Nevertheless, when joined, counsel for Calavo
Growers moved to dismiss on the grounds that any recovery to be had must be obtained under workmen's
compensation. Defendant, Melvin Romney, also joined
in this motion, and the Court dismissed Appellants' Complaint with respect to both Defendants, Melvin Romney
and Calavo Growers on the basis of an affidavit stating
that there was insurance coverage.
A second check with the Industrial Commission by
Appellants' counsel showed that there was no copy of a
policy or contract of insurance on file as required by Section 35-1-47 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953); no
record of a report of the accident had been filed as required by Section 35-1-97 of the Utah Code Annotated
(1953); and no filing card indicating insurance coverage
was available for the period October 1, 1966, to October
1, 1967. There was, however, found to be a notation on
a card for a subsequent period indicating coverage for
the above, 1966-1967 period .. (Tr. No. 12367 at 68-69
and Tr. No. 12730 at 99-100.)
After the District Court had dismissed the Complaint
on the grounds that Appellants were by law limited to
their workmen's compensation remedy, Petitioner, Kenneth Whitmore, filed a workmen's compensation claim
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with the Commission even though more than three years
had elapsed since the accident. It was argued to the Hearing Examiner that Kenneth's parents had been mislead by
Defendants into believing that no workmen's compensation was available and that, therefore, Defendants should
be estopped from asserting the three-year statute of liinitations. In support of this argument Petitioner argued:
that Mr. Romney had advised his parents that no compensation under workmen's compensation was available; that
at no time after suit was filed until over two years later
when the statute of limitations had run had the defense of
workmen's compensation been raised; and that no employers liability insurance policy had been on file with the
Industrial Commission.
Calavo Growers defended Kenneth Whitmore's industrial claim claiming that Kenneth Whitmore had
never been its employee as defined by Utah's Workmen's
Compensation Act, and by asserting lapse of the three
year statute of limitations. Calavo Growers prevailed on
this latter argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HEARING EXAMINER ERRED IN NOT RUL·
ING THAT THE THREE YEAR STATUTE OF LIM·
ITATIONS FOR PRESENTING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIMS TO THE INDUSTRIAL COM·
MISSION IS TOLLED DURING INFANCY.

Section 78-12-36 of the Utah Code Annotated 0953)
provides:

6

If a person entitled to bring an action
is at
the time the cause of action accrued .
( 1) under
the age of majority;
....,.

*

*

The time of such disability is not a part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action.
At the time he was injured, Kenneth Whitmore was
fourteen years old. Due to his minority, the three year
time limitation was tolled and, therefore, the Industrial
Commission Hearing Examiner erred in holding that Kenneth Whitmore's application was barred on the grounds
that it was filed six months late.
In Weaver v. Martori, 69 Ariz. 45, 208 P.2d 652
( 1949), the Arizona Supreme Court dealt with a very
similar case involving a minor. In that case, the guardian ad litem for an injured minor and his parent had
brought suit in the county court to recover damages for
injuries sustained while loading cantaloupes at Defendant's place of business. The case was subsequently removed to federal court, where the case was dismissed on
the ground that Plaintiffs' sole remedy was afforded by
the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Statute. Plaintiffs'
claim before the Arizona Industrial Commission, however,
was held barred because, inter alia, the statute of limitatoins had run. Plaintiffs appealed and on the issue of
tolling the statute of limitations, the Arizona Supreme

Court wrote:
We hold that the limitation of time prescribed
by our Workmen's Compensation Law for the filing of a claim by an employee thereunder is tolled
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during the disability of infancy and that the limitation does not begin to run against a minor until
either a guardian has been appointed or the infant
becomes sui juris, whichever shall first occur.
Linberry v. Town of Mebane, 219 N.C. 256, 13
S.E.2d 429, 142 A.LR. 1033; Allen v. St. Louis.
San Francisco R. Co., 338 Mo. 395, 90 S.W.2d
1050, 105 A.LR. 122. Texts: 71 C.J., Workmen's
Compensation Acts Section 799 and 8 Am. Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation, Section 418.'
Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act makes no provision that the express tolling provision protecting minors
found in Section 78-12-36 should not apply. And, in
view of the general rules of liberal statutory construction which govern Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act,
nothing less than an express provision should operate to
cause the statute of limitations to run against a minor
and negate the tolling provision. The California Supreme
Court apparently adopted such a position in the case of
Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 27
Cal. 2d 437, 439, 164 P.2d 490, 492 (1948). Therein the
court wrote:
It must be remembered that the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation law dealing with limi·
tations of time within which proceedings for com·
pensation may be commenced, like other parts of
the law, are to be liberally construed to the end
that the beneficial features thereof shall not be
lost to employees, and where provisions are sus·
ceptible of an interpretation either beneficial or
detrimental to an injured employee, they must be
construed favorably to the employee. (emphasis
added)
1208 P.2d at 254.

8

Thus, the California Supreme Court would apparently require that a provision operating against the workman be clearly spelled out and that any indefinite wording
be construed in his favor. No clear evidence of a legislative intent to remove the general protections afforded
minors can be found in the Utah Act - only an intent
to restrict minors as well as all other workmen to the
remedy afforded under the Act.
An argument that the general rule tolling statutes
of limitation and thereby protecting infants is not applicable when applied to infants' workmen compensation
claims might possibly be constructed on the basis of
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156
P.2d 885 ( 1945 ). In Ortega, the Utah Supreme Court
stated that the legislature had intended to bring legally
employed minors (the law was subsequently amended to
include illegally employed minors, Laws of Utah (1945)
Chapter 65.) under the provisions and protections of
Utah's workmen's compensation title and that a minor
could not, therefore, disaffirm his contract of employment and thereby avail himself of his common law remedy. Petitioner does not contest this holding, but asserts
that the Ortega holding that a minor workman cannot
disaffirm his employment contract and assert a civil remedy, but is instead limited to the Act's remedy, should not
be extended to make an employed infant sui juris for
all purposes and thereby vitiate the express legislative
protections granted infants in Section 78-12-36. Moreover, such an argument cannot be supported by any express legislative intent in the Workmen's Compensation

9

Act and would be obiter dictum as far as the Ortega holding is concerned.
On the other hand, in Ortega the Utah Supreme
Court cites with approval the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's holding that where a statute does not expressly
confer upon an infant the status of an adult, such status
will not be inferred. 2 Indeed, it is evident that gross injustice would result if the disability protection, tolling
a statute of limitation in the case of a minor, were to be
denied when one considers that the Act covers injured
infant workmen who may be at the very tenderest of ages
due to the fact that even those illegally employed are
bound by its remedy.
It is admitted that the argument that the Industrial
Commission can take jurisdiction inasmuch as the statute
of limitations has been tolled due to Kenneth Whitmore's
disability as a minor is raised for the first time on appeal.
Nevertheless, some questions of jurisdiction can be properly raised for the first time on appeal. Collins v. Indus·
trial Commission, 102 Ariz. 509, 433 P.2d 801, 802 (1967).
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court in Stanley v. Industrial
Commission, 79 Utah 228, 232, 8 P.2d 770, 771 (1932)
has pointed out that the general rule on raising arguments
on appeal is somewhat different when applied to the decisions of the Industrial Commission as compared to the
rulings of a court, the reason therefor lying in the different
obligations and duties of the Industrial Commission as
2ortega v. Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 14, 156 P.2d 885, 891
(1945).
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distinguished from the adversary proceeding of a court.
Unlike a court, the Commission has a duty to make its
own independent finding on the question of whether an
applicant should be compensated. The Utah Supreme
Court stated in Stanley:
"We are not prepared to say that, if it appears from
the record that the commission ignores or fails to
consider some tenable theory of the case upon
which compensation might be granted, the court
might not send it back for consideration of such
issue or theory, provided the evidence was sufficient to demand that such a theory be considered.
The rule that pertains to the courts to the effect
that parties cannot try a case on one theory and
then attempt to gain a reversal upon some other
theory on appeal not advanced on the trial should
probably not be applied as strictly to the commission, especially if the parties were honest and were
not experimenting with the tribunal. The reasons
that lie at the base of that rule as applied to the
courts are not as potent as applied to the commission. It is its duty to determine whether the conditions precedent exist which entitle an applicant to
payment. Consequently it has the duty to determine, regardless of theories advanced by counsel,
whether the conditions precedent exist. In case it
clearly appears it has not performed that duty, this
court would return the record for that purpose.
(emphasis added.)
Petitioner was 14 years old when the accident occurred. The legislative provisions protecting minors
should control the tolling issue in light of the fact that
Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act makes no st?.tement on the question.

11

POINT

II

THE CONCLUSION OF LAW MADE BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S HEARING EXAMINER
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The findings made by the Industrial Commission will
not be disturbed by this Court unless they are not supported by the evidence nor will the Court weigh the evidence
presented. The Hearing Examiner's conclusions of law,
however, are not binding on this Court, and are, in the
instant case, incompatible with his findings. (Tr. No.
12730 at 132).
The Hearing Examiner concluded that no compensation had been received, which would operate to establish a new date from which the three-year limitation period would begin to run pursuant to Section 3 5-1-99 of the
Utah Code Annotated (1953). The Examiner stated that
"at no time since the accident on June 2 has Calavo
Growers of California, or an31 representative of Calavo
Growers, paid any amounts to Applicant by way of compensation." (Tr. No. 12730 at 132) (emphasis added). This
statement, however, is in direct conflict with the Hearing
Examiner's finding that State Farm Insurance Company
had "paid certain medical benefits" on behalf of Mr.
Romney, "Calavo's resident agent in Utah." (Tr. No.
12730 at 132 and 133). The Examiner's legal conclusion
that no payments by way of compensation have been made
is not supported by findings so it is, therefore, impossible
to determine why the medical payments did not constitute
compensation." Several explanations are possible: The
3Afoser v. Industrial Commission, 21 U.2d 51, 53, 440 P.2d 23 (1968).
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Examiner may have believed that "compensation" can
only mean payments made by an employee liability insurance carrier under a workmen's compensation insurance
policy; that to be "compensation" the employer must state
that the payments are compensation; or, that payments
made on behalf of the regional manager and resident
agent are not attributable to Calavo Growers of California. None of these reasons is legally sufficient in light of
the broad definition of "compensation" provided by the
legislature in the statute. "Compensation" is defined by
Subsection 35-1-44 (6) of the Utah Code Annotated (1953)
as "payments and benefits provided for by this title." Section 35-1-45 further provides that an injured employee is
entitled to compensation for loss sustained due to medical
payments.
Kenneth Whitmore was entitled to medical payments
under the act, and medical payments were made by State
Farm Insurance Company on behalf of Mr. Romney, Calavo's Utah agent. This operated to extend the statute of
limitations to three years from the date when the last
4
such compensation was paid.
The Utah Supreme Court has viewed such medical
services or payments provided by the employer as "compensation" within the statutory definition. In ]ones v. Industrial Commission, 17 U.2d 28, 404 P.2d 27 (1965), for
example, the Court stated that the petitioner therein was
barred by the three-year limitation inasmuch as he was
last attended by a doctor more than three years before pre4Said compensation was paid within three years of filing a claim with
the Industrial Commission. (Tr. 12730 at 26).
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senting his claim. Compensation in that case was not narrowly viewed, but included the services of a doctor provided by the employer. The medical payments by State
Farm Insurance Company on the behalf of Mr. Romney,
as Petitioner's employer or as Calavo's representative,
should qualify therefore, as "compensation" and operate
to toll the statute of limitations.

POINT

III

RESPONDENTS' CONDUCT OPERATED TO MISLEAD APPELLANTS TO NOT FILE A WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION CLAIM. RESPONDENTS SHOULD,
THEREFORE, BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Petitioner asserts that Defendants are precluded from
setting up the three-year bar because Petitioner's delay in
filing his claim was attributable to Defendants' conduct.
Rice v. Granite School District, 23 U.2d 22, 456 P.2d 159
( 1969); Utah Apex Mining Co., et al v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 305, 209 P.2d 571 (1949).
The Hearing Examiner's legal conclusion that there
was no conduct on the part of Calavo Growers that would
estop it from asserting the three-year limitation, fails to account for the actions of Melvin Romney, its
agent
for Utah. Petitioner's evidence showed that Mr. Romney
had represenetd that there was no workmen's compensation available. Even the testimony of Mr. Romney shows
that he told the Whitmores that his insurance would take
care of it. He also failed to give Calavo Growers, Calavo's
insurance carrier, or the Industrial Commission any report
14

of this accident, the serious consequences of which he was
well aware. Moreover, from the time suit was first filed
against him in October of 1968 until November of 1970,
neither Romney nor his legal counsel raised the defense or
gave any indication that workmen's compensation might
be available. It was only after the statutory three-year
period had run that workmen's compensation was raised
as a defense.
The only justification, it seems, for a statute of limitation in regard to workmen's compensation claims at all is
to protect the employer and, perhaps indirectly, the insurance carrier from the unexpected and unreported claim.
Defendants cannot assert in this instance, however, that
they have been prejudiced by not knowing of the claim
sooner. Calavo Growers was constructively informed of
the accident through its resident agent, Mr. Romney, who
was physically present when the accident occurred and
fully aware of the extent of Petitioners disability. Thus,
Petitioner's employer knew of the claim from the very
beginning.
Furthermore, to Petitioner's detriment, Calavo Growers did not have a policy of workmen's compensation insurance on file as required by the Utah Code Annotated,
Section 35-1-47 (1953) and any check that was made, or
could have been made, to determine whether the employer
had complied with Section 35-1-48 left, and would have
left, Appellants with the impression that they were free
to proceed with their civil remedy pursuant to Section
35-1-57. (Tr. 12730 at 59.)
15

For the reasons stated above, Appellants were misled
into believing that workmen's compensation was not available. Moreover, inasmuch as Calavo's regional manager
was present at the time the accident occurred and knew
of the seriousness of the injury it cannot be asserted that
Calavo will be prejudiced if it is estopped from asserting
the statute of limitations.
Inasmuch as the Hearing Examiner made no findings
of fact on any of the issues relating to estoppel, the Court
is not bound by the Examiner's legal conclusion that no
estoppel-like conduct had taken place. Moser v. Industrial
Commission, 21 U.2d 51, 440 P.2d 23 (1963).
POINT

IV

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN TREATING
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AS A MO·
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMIS·
SING APPELLANTS' CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE.

This Court has consistently held that summary judg·
ment is inappropriate when there are material factual
issues in dispute. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. United
States Resources, Inc., 24 U.2d 346, 348, 471, P.2d 165
(1970) and Gillmor v. Carter, 15 U.2d 280, 283, 391 P.2d
426 (1964). Nevertheless, Appellants' Complaint in the
lower court was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Sec·
tion 35-1-60 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) on the
ground set forth by Respondents, that workmen's com·
pensation was Appellants' sole remedy. Upon Kenneth's
filing with the Industrial Commission, however, Calavo

16
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P

t
1

Growers claimed that Kenneth Whitmore was not an employee and that, besides, any claim was barred by the
three-year statute of limitations. If the rulings of the
District Court and the Industrial Commission are permitted to stand, therefore, Appellants will have been effectively barred from any remedy.
Several factual determinations were not made in the
lower court which if resolved in favor of Appellants
would establish the right to pursue a civil remedy. The
lower court seemingly based its decision to dismiss Appellants' complaint with prejudice upon the affidavit of Virginia Leahy, policy clerk with the Industrial Commission,
who stated that a policy of employees' liability insurance
was in effect covering Calavo Growers at the time of the
accident. (The affadivit did not state that the policy was
on file.) None of the submission of the parties, however,
furnishes sufficient information to determine whether at
the time of the accident Melvin Romney and Kenneth
Whitmore were acting as co-employees of Calavo Growers. 5 If not, Kenneth Whitmore would not be a fellowservant with Romney of the common employer, Calavo,
and Appellants should be free to pursue their civil remedy. u
In Christean v. Industrial Commission 113 Utah 451,
458, 196 P.2d 502 (1943) this Court adopted the criteria
suggested in the Restatement of the Law of Agency to be
"See Utah Code Annotated §35-1-42 (1953); Galleyos v. Stringham,
21U.2d139, 422 P.2d 31 (1968).
GUtah Code Ann.

(1971 Supp.): Worthen v. Shurtleff and

Andrews, Inc., 19 U.2d 80, 426 P.2d 223 0967).

17

used to determine whether one was an independent contractor. 7 These criteria were not considered by the District
Court, nor indeed was any determination made on the
question of whether Romney was within the scope of his
employment, or whether he was acting as an independent
contractor at the time of the accident.
Moreover, the District Court should have determined
whether Kenneth Whitmore was an employee of Calavo
Growers. Appellants alleged in their amended complaint
that on June 2, 1967, Kenneth Whitmore had been an em·
ployee of "Defendants Calavo Growers of California and
Melvin J. Romney, or one of them . . . . " (Tr. No. 12367
at 411). Upon a hearing on the merits, Kenneth Whit·
more could be found not to have been an employee of Calavo Growers, as in fact alleged by counsel for Calavo
Growers before the Industrial Commission (Tr. No. 12730
at 120). He may have nevertheless been an employee of
Melvin Romney. Melvin Romney was not covered by a
policy of employer's liability insurance at the time of the
accident, or at least it was so never alleged before the trial
court. Appellants, therefore, may be able to pursue their
civil remedy as provided by Section 35-1-57 of the Utah
Code Annotated (1971 Supp.) But this fact is still in dispute-it having not been resolved by the lower court or
the Industrial Commission. Thus, if the District Cocrt's
order is permitted to stand, Appellants will never have
opportunity to have this issue resolved.
7Cited with approval in Sutton v. Industrial Commission, 9 U.2d 339,
341, 344 P.2d 538 (1959).
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Furthermore, Kenneth Whitmore may not have been
acting within the scope of any employment at all when
the accident occurred. The Hearing Examiner implies that
this might be his ruling when he states that Kenneth was
injured while merely riding home. (Tr. No. 12730 at 132.)
Appellants should be permitted to have Kenenth's status
as an employee at the time of the accident ajudicated to
determine whether workmen's compensation applies at all.
In addition to dismissing the case when material issues of fact were still unresolved, the District Court erred
in treating Respondents' motion to dismiss as a motion
for summary judgment and ordering Appellants' Complaint dismissed with prejudice. Rule 56(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleadings . . . .
Respondents' motions to dismiss were supported by
an affidavit to the effect that a policy of insurance was in
force, but were not supported as required by Rule 56(c)
with regard to the issues stated above regarding the status
of Melvin Romney and Kenneth Whitmore as employees.
Respondents' Motions to Dismiss were therefore, improperly granted in that material questions of fact have
been left unresolved, and this case should be remanded
to the District Court for a determination on the merits.
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POINT

V

RESPONDENT ROMNEY WAIVED THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
THEREFORE, IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS'
PLAINT AS AGAINST HIM.

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively . . . assumption of risk,
contributory negligence . . . injury by fellow servant . . . , and any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense. (emphasis added)
Rule 8(d) provides that "(a}verments in a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is required . . . are admitted
when not denied in the responsive pleading."
In response to Appellants' initial Complaint, Defend·
ant Romney raised the affirmative defense of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk. Likewise, Defend·
ant Romney raised these same defenses in his Answer to
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Romney did not, how·
ever, raise the defense of fellow servant, or workmen's
compensation as provided by Rule 8. Therefore, this defense was waived by Romney and the District Court erred
in dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with respect to hiD.
Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 U.2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 0956).
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CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate the Industrial Commission's
ruling that Petitioner's claim for compensation is barred
by the three-year statute of limitations. To permit the
statute of limitations to run against a fourteen-year-old,
at least until a guardian ad !item is appointed, would be
unreasonable and contrary to the provisions made by the
Utah Legislature. Moreover, in light of the broad definition given the term "compensation" in the Workmen's
Compensation Act, this Court should rule that the last date
upon which medical payments were made by a foreign corporation's resident agent, or by someone else on his behalf,
to an injured workman is the date from which the threeyear limitation period for presenting workmen's compensation claims begins to run.
The Hearing Examiner's conclusion that there was no
estopping conduct on the part of Calavo Growers of California or their Utah representative, Mr. Romney, is difficult for Petitioner to refute inasmuch as no findings of
fact were made in support of this conclusion. It is asserted,
however, that the record clearly indicates that the Whitmores were whipsawed by the use of two forums. Misled
by Romney's representations and Calavo's failure to report the accident to the Industrial Commission or have a
copy of its employers' liability insurance on file, the Whitmores were induced to pursue their claim in District Court.
After the case had pended for two years, the defense of
workmen's compensation was raised to secure dismissal of
Appellants' Complaint in District Court. And, thereafter,
the statute of limitations was used as a defense to Petition21

er's claim for compensation. If this is not a case for the
application of estoppel, Petitioner is at least entitled to
know what the findings of facts were upon which this
decision was based.
Appellants seek reversal of the District Court's dismissal of their Complaint with prejudice on the grounds
that material issues of fact are in dispute which were not
resolved in the District Court, and which if resolved in
Appellants' favor may permit recovery in a civil action.
Furthermore, these issues were not resolved by the sub·
missions of the parties and dismissal was, therefore, improper under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In any
event, the District Court's dismissal was improper with
respect to Appellants' Complaint against Romney because
the affirmative defense of fellow servant or workmen's
compensation had been waived by Romney inasmuch as
it was not timely raised.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert F. Orton
Earl Jay Peck
NIELSEN, CONDER,
HANSEN AND HENRIOD
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Kenneth Whitmore
and Sam 0. Whitmore
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